B. Any qualified assignment made by the insurer represents the entire agreement between [Hughes and the most important defendant]. The courts will not apply a contract to give an expectation, unless there is a valuable consideration. For example, the defendant “the son” would be entitled, in the context of a property deposit, to an equal portion of the real estate with his other siblings, acquired by his mother in a colony. This part was his part only if it was attributed to him at the discretion of his mothers. Prior to this award, the respondent transferred his benefit to a voluntary count. He admitted or admitted to affecting something to which he might be entitled in the future, not a conditional interest. It found that the judgment was not valid and addressed earlier points indicating that the respondent cannot be compelled to authorize the agents to retain the designated amount.  Here, the language of the contract is not ambiguous and expressly prohibits Hughes from selling, assigning or transferring his right to future structured settlement payments. Mr Hughes said he was prepared to be bound by the terms of the Qualified Assignment and Annuity Contract uniform included in the compromise agreement. Peachtree attempts to emphasize the task by arguing that Hughes peachtree merely designated Peachtree as its “agent” for receiving periodic payments. However, Peachtree`s transfer request and sale contract 7 between Peachtree and Hughes clearly show that Hughes agreed to “sell and allocate” 237 monthly payments of $1,500 to Peachtree. Peachtree also argues that MetLife cannot attempt to restrict Hughes` property rights, including the right to transfer structured pension benefits.
However, as Peachtree noted in his transfer application, Hughes does not have the structure of pension benefits. MLIC has issued the pension and MTRG holds the pension. Hughes is the “beneficiary” of structured pension benefits. Even if the agency were authorized, we doubt that it would be effective in this case. An agency is usually a consensual relationship in which the agent accepts control of another, the client, and the principal obligated declares that the agent is acting for the client. Camp Mystic, Inc. Eastland, 399 S.W.3d 266, 279 (Tex.App.- San Antonio 2012, no pet.). An essential element of an agency relationship is the right of the client to control the agent`s actions.
Sendjar v. Gonzalez, 520 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Tex.Civ.App. – San Antonio 1975, no writ). For there to be an agency relationship, there must be (1) a meeting of minds between the parties to establish the relationship and (2) an act that constitutes the appointment of the agent. Toka Gen. Contractors v. Wm. Rigg Co., No. 04-12-00474-CV, 2014 WL 1390448, at 8 (Tex.App.- San Antonio Apr. 9, 2014, far. denied) (mem.
op.). Here, Hughes (as a sponsor) has no control over Peachtree (as an agent). See Camp Mystic, 399 S.W.3d to 279 (notes that the agency relationship requires the client`s right to control the agent`s actions). The sales contract contains no language indicating that Hughes has the right to control Peachtree.